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Thinking of Russia
Finnish Neutrality after the 
Cold War and the Influence of 
Russian Neighborhood on Finnish 
Cooperation with NATO
Lucie Zimmermanová, Zdeněk Kříž, Eva Doleželová
In recent years, Finland has closely cooperated with NATO and Finn-
ish politicians emphasize that Finland may consider joining the Al-
liance at any point. However, this step is unlikely in the foreseeable 
future. Russia’s  aggressive actions abroad disconcert Finland; as this 
article shows, even after Russia’s war with Georgia and the breakout 
of the crisis in Ukraine, the situation is not deemed serious enough by 
the Finns for them to risk a serious deterioration of relations with their 
eastern neighbor. Rather than crossing the interests of Moscow, whose 
perception of the world Finland has been able uniquely to understand 
thanks to its historical experience, the country opts for a more com-
plex, yet also safer, path of balancing between ever-closer cooperation 
with NATO, and maintaining the status of a non-member country.
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When US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vlad-
imir Putin, met briefly in Helsinki in July 2018, the Finnish president, 
Sauli Niinistö, told CNN that he sometimes wondered why people 




for Finland will be to update its public profile […]. As seen by the USA 
and Russia, Finland is no longer a  “neutral” country, but an estab-
lished member of the West, even if it is not a NATO member’, not-
ed the website of the public service broadcaster Yle, before the presi-
dential summit.2 ‘Finland is an EU member and clearly belongs to the 
West […] Finland thus is not a neutral country. Not anymore’, wrote 
the largest-circulation Finnish daily newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, 
in a commentary on the event.3 The facts confirm these statements: 
Finland’s political leaders regularly participate in the top-level talks of 
NATO member states (and President Niinistö even takes part in the al-
liance’s summits); Finland is involved in NATO military exercises, and 
in recent years has established close military cooperation with the USA 
and Sweden. In government documents and speeches abroad, Finnish 
politicians emphasize that the door to NATO remains open and that 
the country reserves the option to consider its accession to the alliance 
at any point.
Finland no longer wants to be considered a neutral country – and 
given the above, it should not be. At the same time, it adheres closely to 
the policy of military non-alignment. The difference between the two 
concepts rests in the measure of its activity in the international system 
and in the linkage of the country’s  security policy with the security 
structures of its allies and alliances. The term ‘military non-alignment’ 
can be understood as a  subspecies of neutrality that is exclusively 
linked with security policy and non-membership of military organi-
zations, without thereby limiting cooperation in other areas and on 
other platforms. Finns emphasize that they belong to the West, and 
indeed since the end of the Cold War the country has firmly embedded 
itself in Western structures. Describing their country as neutral can 
offend Finns, as it foists upon them a Cold War era geopolitical per-
spective, when Finland straddled the West and the East and sought to 
maintain an optimal balance between considering Soviet interests and 
pursuing an independent foreign policy. On the other hand, despite 
much closer cooperation than before, so far the Finns have refused to 
join NATO, and we believe this is because of Moscow’s disapproval.
The impact of Finland potentially joining NATO is a key topic of 
scholarly works that address the idea. Although authors have differ-
ing views on what the ultimate consequences of such a decision would 
be, beyond considering the financial and military commitments the 





experts say that Finland should not seek membership in the foresee-
able future.4
Antti Sierla and Aurélie Domisse have argued that, despite Mos-
cow’s  disapproval, Finland’s  accession to NATO might help the dia-
logue between Russia and the West, thanks to the country’s particu-
lar historical experience with its Eastern neighbor.5 Such optimism is 
rare. Experts generally agree that Finland’s accession to NATO would 
mean a serious deterioration in Finno-Russian relations. They do not, 
however, anticipate a  military intervention by Moscow. The main 
arguments for these conclusions are the following: Russia’s econom-
ic relations with the EU are too important to jeopardize; historically 
the relations between Helsinki and Moscow have been good; and Fin-
land’s membership of NATO would act as a deterrent.6 Kari Möttölä 
argued that it would only make sense to join the alliance if the country 
were under threat. As long as there is no direct security threat, there is 
no need to provoke Russia.7 Magnus Nordenman too does not expect 
Finland to join NATO in the near future.8
The security situation in the region has changed, particularly after 
two acts of Russian aggression: the war in Georgia and the crisis in 
Ukraine. These events have disconcerted the Finns, as shown by the 
short-term fluctuations in the otherwise long-stable public opinion 
with respect to NATO, closer cooperation with the alliance and the 
USA and recognition in official government papers of the worrying 
changes in the security environment. Despite this it is unlikely that 
Finland would seek NATO membership in the near future. The coun-
try’s military non-alignment has become such an integral part of Finn-
ish strategic thought that neither the Russo-Georgian war nor the 
crisis in Ukraine has pushed the Finns towards genuine consideration 
of membership. Paradoxically this is because Finland increasingly sees 
Russia as a security threat. So far, the Finns have not seen the potential 
gains from joining NATO as outweighing the risks of a sharp deterio-
ration in their relations with the eastern neighbor. Proceeding from 
its historical experience, Finland has adopted a strategy of considering 
Russian security interests when deciding the future avenues of its own 
security policy.
The first section of this article analyses military non-alignment as 
part of Finland’s strategic thought and observes its transformations on 
three events that affected the country’s security situation: the end of 




second section presents the strengthening of military cooperation be-
tween Finland and NATO, as well as between Finland, Sweden and the 
USA. The third section is dedicated to the Russian position on Finnish 
security policy and Finland’s factoring in of Russian security interests. 
In the conclusion the article once again asks why, given that Finland 
cooperates closely with NATO, the country has not yet joined, and 
presents our answers to this topical question.
Military non-alignment as part of Finland’s strategic thought
From neutrality to military non-alignment
Finland emerged in 1917 by emancipating itself from tsarist Russia. The 
main principles of its interwar policy were liberal democracy, sover-
eignty and, in the end, neutrality. The last was not entirely a matter of 
free choice, as had been the case with other Nordic countries: Finns de-
sired foreign security cooperation that would anchor them more firmly 
to the West. However, prior to World War II they failed to establish 
relations with a great power or to build a security alliance – but not for 
want of trying.9 During the 1930s, then, following the model of their 
closest ally, Sweden, they embraced a  purely pragmatic neutrality. In 
the Finnish situation of the time, neutrality largely meant counterbal-
ancing Russian influence. However, Finland failed to maintain an inde-
pendent policy. In November 1939, it was attacked by the Red Army and 
drawn into World War II, out of which it emerged after much rigmarole 
as a former ally of Germany, vanquished by the Soviet Union.
During the Cold War Finland sought to act as a neutral country. De-
cisions about its foreign and security policy were nonetheless depen-
dent on the Soviet Union. Finnish foreign policy was adjusted by the 
Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with 
the Soviet Union signed in 1948. In this treaty the parties pledged not 
to create or become involved in any alliance directed against the coun-
terparty. In practice, throughout the Cold War this wording permit-
ted the Finns only one foreign-policy line: neutrality. What was most 
important for Finland was the preamble to the agreement, in which 
the Soviet Union recognized Finland’s determination to remain out-
side great-power conflict – this was explicitly requested by the Finnish 
delegation.10 Finnish politicians viewed this formulation as the Soviet 
recognition of Finland’s neutrality.11
The termination of the agreement in March 1992 meant that Finns 




pretation of neutrality. After a long discussion that unfolded against 
the background of making Finland’s accession to the European Com-
munities compatible with the principle of neutrality, in 1992 the gov-
ernment defined Finland’s  foreign policy strategy as a  combination 
of independent defense and military non-alignment.12 This implied 
a significant shift in strategic thought as a whole. Finns decided of-
ficially to step out of the grey zone or no man’s land, where they had 
been throughout the Cold War as part of the so-called Finlandization, 
and openly to avow Western political structures.13 Finland did not ex-
press an interest in joining NATO in the early 1990s,14 but in 1994 
signed up for the Partnership for Peace program. Its involvement was 
intended to strengthen Europe’s security and the country’s determi-
nation to participate only in peacekeeping and humanitarian opera-
tions was explicitly noted.15 Throughout the 1990s, the Finns consis-
tently strengthened their relations with NATO and became involved 
in several of its crisis management operations.16 At the same time they 
repeatedly emphasized in international forums that though they were 
not seeking membership at that time, they would like to have the op-
tion in the future.17 Finland’s close cooperation with NATO confirmed 
the shift in the country’s policy from neutrality to military non-align-
ment.
Military non-alignment in the context of the Russo-Georgian war
Before the Russo-Georgian war, Finland’s accession to NATO was not 
on the table. There was not much support for it among the political 
parties or Finnish citizens. Political leaders tended to emphasize the 
negative aspects of accession. From 2006, only the National Coalition 
Party (Kansallinen Kokoomus, abbreviated Kok.) – the strongest pro-At-
lantic force in Finnish politics – openly supported accession.18 The 
president of Finland at the time, Tarja Halonen of the Social Dem-
ocratic Party of Finland (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue, SPD), 
who by virtue of her office exerted strong influence over Finnish for-
eign policy throughout her mandate from 2000 to 2012, strongly op-
posed accession.19 Her position chimed in with the popular mood. In 
2002, nearly 70 percent of Finns said that the country should not join 
the alliance.20 The accession of the Baltic countries to NATO did not 
cause a shift in popular opinion in Finland. In 2004, 65 percent of the 





Although the Georgian crisis revived the Finnish security discus-
sion, it did not bring new arguments. On the one hand, the crisis was 
used to emphasize the urgency of a  clear decision about the coun-
try’s  relationship with NATO. On the other, political parties did not 
become more involved in steering the social debate, nor in shifting 
popular opinion towards support for accession.22
An official government report on Finnish security and defense 
policy from 2009 did not consider increased tension or aggression 
in neighboring areas impossible, but also did not anticipate direct 
military pressure or aggression against Finland. The report noted 
the findings of the Parliamentary Security Policy Monitoring Group 
which concluded that the foundations of Finnish security policy 
needed no substantial change. The document also stated that “from 
now on, strong grounds exist for considering Finland’s membership 
of NATO. As regards a decision on possible membership, broad polit-
ical consensus is essential, and it is important to take public opinion 
into consideration.”23
The approach taken by Finnish parliamentary parties was un-
changed by the Georgian crisis. The National Coalition Party contin-
ued to be the main supporter of the country’s  joining NATO, while 
center-left parties took a negative stance towards participation in mil-
itary alliances.24
As far as public opinion was concerned, there was a sudden decrease 
in the number of opponents to Finland’s joining NATO in 2008, but 
the number of supporters did not increase; rather it was the number 
of the undecided that did. The numbers of those for and against mem-
bership were about equal: about a third of those polled thought that 
Finland should join NATO, while a third was against. The remaining 
third did not know with which opinion to side.25 Opinion polls do not 
indicate significant shifts in popular opinion of Russia or security in 
the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian war. The Finns started to view 
the long-term prospects of security somewhat more negatively. A third 
of the population thought that the security situation over the next ten 
years would become ‘more threatening’ to Finland – in 2007, 22 per-
cent expressed this view. More than half thought that the situation 
would remain the same and only 6 percent thought it would improve. 
Those who expected a deterioration were then asked about the causes 
of increased security threats; most answers were linked with Russian 





fears of Russia arming, nuclear weapons and Russia’s  relations with 
the Baltic countries.)26
If the Georgian crisis stimulated Finnish politicians to think about 
NATO accession, public opinion remained consistent – in 2009 the 
number of those opposing it started to increase again – and the official 
government line on defense and security did not change much in the 
subsequent years. A 2012 government report on security and defense 
policy noted that Finland was not a member of any military alliance 
and emphasized that defense cooperation did not imply any change 
in the fundamental security strategy.27 After a  brief scare caused by 
Russian aggression in Georgia, Finland decided to stick with military 
non-alignment. Joining NATO remained a purely theoretical option.
Military non-alignment in the context of the crisis in Ukraine
The crisis in Ukraine, the increased military presence of Moscow in the 
Baltic and more and more conspicuous Russian activities in northern 
Europe – from maritime incidents to airspace violations – disturbed 
Finnish politicians across the board.28 Security policy became a chief 
issue of campaigning prior to the 2015 parliamentary elections, but 
rather than NATO membership it was the increases in the defense 
budget that were discussed. A coalition government emerged out of 
the election, consisting of three parties: the centrist, liberal Centre 
Party of Finland (Suomen Keskusta, Kesk.); the populist and nation-
alist True Finns (Perussuomalaiset, PS); and the center-right National 
Coalition Party.29 The True Finns, who strongly criticized the EU and 
NATO, obtained the posts of foreign and defense ministers in the new 
government.30 2017, about half of the PS members of parliament, who 
tended to be more conservatively-minded, split off (including the two 
ministers) and founded a center-right Blue Reform party (Sininen tule-
vaisuus, Sin.) 
Today, the left-wing SPD is the strongest party of the opposition. 
Of the government parties, only the National Coalition Party supports 
NATO accession openly, but does not make the issue its priority.31 Also 
supporting accession in parliament is the Swedish People’s  Party of 
Finland (Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue, abbreviated RKP in Finn-
ish and SFP in Swedish), which has few seats.32 The overwhelming ma-
jority of parliamentary parties continue to oppose Finland’s accession 




Despite the events unfolding in the region, the center-right govern-
ment has so far stuck to the policy of military non-alignment. The most 
recent Finnish government report on defense policy of July 2017 noted 
that following the conflict in eastern Ukraine the security situation in 
Finland’s neighborhood deteriorated and military tensions in the Bal-
tic increased. On the other hand, improvements in military readiness 
and the increased defense budgets of the states in the region were seen 
as positive. The document articulates Finland’s  current relationship 
with NATO as follows: ‘Finland is a country which does not belong to 
any military alliance. It carries out practical cooperation with NATO 
and continues to maintain the option to seek NATO membership’.34
An analysis of the anticipated security situation of Finland over the 
next two decades (Defense Perspectives in the 2030s), published in 
June by the Finnish Ministry of Defense, makes similar points. Ten-
sions in the region have increased. The use of another state’s  force 
against Finland cannot presently be ruled out, nor can one assume 
that were a conflict to flare up near its borders, Finland would be able 
to avoid it. In this respect, Finland seeks close international coopera-
tion in providing security to northern Europe and the Baltic region.35 
The document emphasizes the increasing significance of international 
cooperation for Finnish national defense capabilities. In a  long-term 
perspective, it describes these partners as the most important: the EU, 
NATO, NORDEFCO, Sweden and the USA, and, by extension, all EU 
and NATO member countries. Finland will largely use its partnership 
with NATO to reinforce its own defenses. The analysis argues that 
Finland’s  potential joining of NATO will depend on several factors: 
Finland’s evaluations of its own security situation; the alliance’s will-
ingness to admit new members; and the results of an analysis of the 
evolving international security situation by member countries.36 Russia 
is not explicitly mentioned as a factor impacting the Finnish decision 
about NATO accession.
Focusing now on public opinion, the position of most Finns has 
been to maintain military non-alignment even after the Russian ag-
gression in Ukraine, though opinion polls show a slow increase in the 
proportion of the undecided and a decrease in the number of oppo-
nents to Finland’s joining NATO. Between the Georgian war and the 
crises in Ukraine, the opponents of accession stood at 70 percent of 
the population, a proportion that decreased to 60 percent after 2014. 




NATO jumped by nine percentage points in 2014, though remaining 
a minority position. It decreased gradually over the following years.37 
However, most Finns would agree with membership if their political 
leaders were unified in supporting it.38 According to an autumn 2017 
poll by the Ministry of Defense, more than 60 percent were against, 
22 percent were for and 17 percent had no opinion on Finland’s NATO 
membership.39 A survey by the largest-circulation Finnish daily news-
paper, Helsingin Sanomat, in November 2017 had 59 percent of respon-
dents against joining NATO; 22 percent supporting membership in the 
USA-led military alliance; and 19 percent not yet decided.40 In another 
poll, by the public-service broadcaster Yle in December 2017, 53 percent 
of Finns were against their country joining NATO, 19 percent were for 
and nearly 28 percent were undecided.41 More recent data by the dailies 
Uuusi Suomi and Iltalehti offer similar figures: 20 percent of the polled 
supporting Finland’s  joining NATO, 50 percent against, 30 percent 
with no opinion. However, if the president were to recommend acces-
sion, 42 percent of the last poll would support the decision.42
Evolution of public opinion as concerned with maintaining military 
non-alignment was subject to the same trend. After the beginning of 
the crisis in Ukraine, the support for this foreign-policy line decreased 
(from nearly 70 percent in 2014 to less than 60 percent in 2015), but 
it was still supported by more than half of Finns and the numbers of 
those against were minimal.43
The presidential election held in January 2018 was an important in-
dicator of public opinion as well as of the state of the security-policy 
debate in Finland. The only presidential candidate openly supporting 
joining NATO was Nils Torvalds (RKP). He placed last, taking 1.5 per-
cent of the vote, while the incumbent, Sauli Niinistö, was declared the 
clear winner in the very first round. Incidentally, the turnout was the 
lowest since the introduction of direct election, testifying to the fact 
that most Finns wished for continuity in security policy, i.e. rejected 
joining NATO while maintaining close security cooperation with the 
alliance, the EU and especially Sweden, as well as keeping an active 
dialogue open with Russia.44
The development of military cooperation between Finland 
and its Western partners
In matters of security, Finland cooperates widely – both bilaterally and 




icy towards Russia with close cooperation with NATO, while at the 
same time developing security collaborations with other countries and 
organizations outside the immediate structures of the alliance. Matti 
Pessu of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) has gone 
as far as to question whether Finland still is a militarily non-alignment 
county, given the substantial strengthening of the networks of its bi-
lateral relations since the crisis in Ukraine.45
Finland chiefly cooperates with Sweden and the United States. Mul-
tilaterally, the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) platform is 
important. Last but not least, the Finns cooperate with the EU’s Com-
mon Security and Defense Policy.
The evolution of military cooperation between Finland and NATO
Finland started to cooperate with NATO in 1994, having joined the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP). At a 2014 NATO summit in Wales, Finland 
took a step to deepen its collaboration by joining an individual pro-
gram, thus becoming an “Enhanced Opportunities Partner.” In 2017, 
the modus was extended for another three years.
Since the mid-1990s, Finland has participated in NATO joint exer-
cises and in its operations: IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
K-FOR in Kosovo and ISAF/Resolute Support in Afghanistan. The 
Finns are also involved in the training and education of NATO soldiers 
and in special innovative platforms such as Strategic Airlift Capability, 
Smart Defense and NATO Response Force.46
Finland’s top leaders take part in meetings concerned with security 
in the Baltic region and northern Europe in the “29+2” format (NATO 
member states plus Finland and Sweden) and President Niinistö goes 
to alliance summits. It is sometimes hard to tell where the boundary 
between NATO members and non-members is, when one looks at Fin-
land.
The evolution of military cooperation between Finland, Sweden 
and the USA
Military cooperation between Finland and Sweden has a  long history. 
In recent years its importance has increased, as the security situation 
in the region, viewed from the points of view of the Finns and Swedes, 
has deteriorated. The countries also cooperate in respect of NATO: for 
Finland, there would be little point in joining the alliance if Sweden 





be practically cut off from other member countries. The importance of 
Finno-American relations in the domain of security is also growing. The 
support granted by the USA to Finland has long been one of the chief ar-
guments of Finns who press for their country to join NATO. While Finns 
will not find the resolve to join the alliance for some time yet, they have 
decided to build closer links with the USA without any delay.
In early 2014, the then minister of defense, Carl Haglund, described 
strong bilateral relations with the USA and an active partnership with 
NATO as the two crucial security collaborations Finland had.47 The 
effectiveness of this approach has been confirmed by security experts 
Stefan Forss and Pekka Holopainen, who described strong security 
cooperation among Nordic countries, supported by US security guar-
antees ‘in whatever form they may take’, as key to stabilizing the secu-
rity situation in the Baltic after the crisis in Ukraine.48 In this respect, 
since the outbreak of the crisis, the discussion about Finland’s security 
policy has followed the main argument by the proponents of NATO 
membership, employed ever since the early 2000s: close cooperation 
with the USA.
Finland has responded to the unrest created by Russian military 
activities outside their own territory by enhanced cooperation with 
partners from abroad. Since 2016, the Finnish and Swedish air forces 
have held extensive exercises together.49 For the first time in 15 years, 
in summer 2017, a bilateral meeting between the presidents of the USA 
and Finland took place when Sauli Niinistö visited the White House. 
One of the main matters under discussion was security.50 In autumn 
2017, Defense Minister Jussi Niinistö (Sin.) announced a plan to un-
dertake large-scale military maneuvers in Finland – to which part-
ner countries of the region as well as the USA would be invited – and 
described the official justification for the exercises as follows: ‘It is 
important for the defense forces to have the preparedness to accept 
international assistance if we are faced with a crisis’. Sweden almost 
immediately confirmed that it would take part. However, the project 
is still at the planning stage and the maneuvers will take place in 2020 
at the earliest.51
In November 2017, the defense ministers of Finland, Sweden and the 
United States met in Helsinki to discuss the options for closer collabo-
ration between their countries. As they all already had bilateral agree-
ments, their meeting was about giving their cooperation a  concrete 




Subsequently, in May 2018, a Trilateral Statement of Intent was signed. 
The document’s aim is to enhance three-way cooperation in defense, 
including strengthening ‘the strategic partnership between the EU 
and NATO’.53 The statement is not legally binding. Finnish Defense 
Minister Niinistö denies that it is a preliminary step towards NATO 
accession.54 Rather, it is a declaration of foreign-security belonging of 
the two Nordic countries, as well as of the US security interests in the 
Baltic Sea region. According to Salonius-Pasternak, a Finnish security 
expert, the statement creates the conditions for a greater US presence 
in Finnish and Swedish security issues. In practical terms, it will also 
facilitate the conduct of joint military exercises.55 The signatories make 
no effort to hide the fact that the statement is a response to Russia’s ag-
gressive foreign policy.56
Russia, Finland and neutrality
Russia’s position on the shifts in Finnish military policy
NATO enlargement has long been seen in Russia as a process that is 
incompatible with Russian security interests. The coming together of 
Finland and NATO and discussion about Finland possibly joining the 
alliance have long been viewed negatively in Russia. In 2016, Russian 
Foreign Minister Lavrov said in this context that ‘were Finland to join 
the anti-Russian actions’, Russia would have to respond adequately.57 
In July 2016, Vladimir Putin declared that if Finland joined NATO, a re-
positioning of Russian armed forces would follow.58 In the same year an 
expert commission concluded:
Russia will attempt to thwart any move by Finland or Swe-
den to join NATO. The historical record of previous NATO 
enlargements, despite the fact that Finland is not viewed by 
Russia in the same light as Ukraine or Georgia, indicates that 
political and economic reactions may be strong, even harsh, 
notably during the transition phase. Even while stopping short 
of the use of force, specific counter-measures would be diffi-
cult to predict.59
This Russian position has remained essentially unchanged since 
2016. During his August 2018 visit to Finland, President Putin repeated 
that Russia disapproves of Finland’s getting closer to NATO.60 Overall, 
the Russian approach towards Finland can be seen as a combination 
of two strategies: one of intimidation, the other of reassurance; rather 




Generally speaking, Russia considers Finland’s  possible NATO 
membership a ‘red line’ and makes its position quite clear. This is not 
a purely military question. Russia has invested a lot of political capital 
in the ‘containment’ of Finland’s potential NATO membership, and if 
Finland were to join the alliance it would be a political defeat for Rus-
sia of the first magnitude. Yet it seems that Russia has many fewer res-
ervations about enhanced cooperation between NATO and Finland, 
military cooperation included, as long as the country does not actually 
join NATO. Bergquist, Heisbourg, Nyberg and Tiilikainen believe that 
the Russian strategy that aims to prevent countries joining NATO – 
a strategy that is based on intimidation rather than reassurance – is 
counterproductive today but is fully in keeping with the historical Rus-
sian and Soviet political culture.61
Finland’s considerations of Russian security interests
Our main argument is that Finnish strategic thought has embraced 
the practice of considering Russian security interests to such an extent 
that Finland’s  abandonment of military non-alignment (and hence 
also joining NATO) are very unlikely. The Finns learned to anticipate 
Russian responses to their own security policy during the Cold War, 
when a policy of placating a suspicious Kremlin helped them to main-
tain some space to maneuver in at least some policy areas and retain 
a degree of sovereignty. Presumably, the effort not to provoke Russia 
was one of the reasons the Finns did not consider joining NATO in the 
1990s, as the same motive can be discerned behind the Finnish deci-
sion to remain outside the alliance today.
The Finns have also addressed the Russian question in official gov-
ernment reports on defense and security. A  2012 report noted that 
Russia’s  foreign policy, and also its domestic developments in terms 
of democracy and the transformation of its armed forces, impact the 
security situation in Finland’s vicinity as much as Finnish foreign poli-
cy. The government pointed out the Russian understanding of NATO 
enlargement as a political and military issue. From the viewpoint of 
Moscow, enlargement weakens its efforts to achieve a multi-polar in-
ternational system, and threatens the Russian sphere of influence.62 
In a  2016 report, Finland’s  increasing disquiet over Russia’s  aggres-
sive policy was expressed as follows: ‘The security policy environment 
of Finland, a  member of the Western community, has transformed. 




will directly impact Finland. The use or threat of military force against 
Finland cannot be excluded’.63
Although the document described NATO as a ‘stabilizing influence 
in the Baltic Sea region’, a decision about Finland’s membership would 
require extensive debate and careful consideration of all the conse-
quences.64
The most recent Finnish government report on defense policy, dat-
ed July 2017, noted that the strategic importance of the region has in-
creased. There has also been increased military activity in the Artic, as 
the Kola Peninsula is a place of strategic importance for Russia, which 
keeps its nuclear weapons there. The Finns see Russia’s  activities as 
serving its efforts to reinforce its great-power status and to establish 
a security regime based on spheres of influence. It proved that Russia 
is able to reach strategic decisions quickly and does not hesitate to use 
military force to achieve its objectives.65
Finland responds to Russian activities by cooperating more close-
ly with its partners, especially Sweden and the USA, but also NATO. 
It does not, however, intend to take the decisive step of seeking full 
membership of the alliance for now. One of the factors informing Fin-
land’s careful approach is its important energy cooperation with Rus-
sia. Finland imports nearly two-thirds of its primary energy sources 
and Russia is the most important supplier. Finland takes active mea-
sures to improve its energy security and to increase its self-sufficiency, 
but this is a long-term process that could give the country significantly 
greater energy independence by 2030 at the earliest.66 Even the most 
vocal advocates of NATO accession have to pay heed to public opinion, 
which remains opposed to the idea, largely due to fears over the Rus-
sian response. In a 2016 opinion poll, most of the Finns who rejected 
NATO accession cited their country’s proximity to Russia as a justifica-
tion for their response. They thought that membership of the alliance 
would be an unwarranted provocation.67 However, most Finns view 
military cooperation with NATO and the USA positively.68 They see 
Russia not just as the reason that joining NATO would not be a sensi-
ble decision for their country, but also as the main threat from which 
their cooperation with the alliance and the USA should defend them. 
A poll by the dailies Uuusi Suomi and Iltalehti published in June 2018 
revealed that nearly half of Finns support more training of their armed 
forces with their USA and NATO counterparts as a measure against 





The fundamental line of Finnish foreign policy is to maintain good 
relations with the East, to gradually strengthen links with the West, 
and to keep the largest possible space for maneuvers. The crisis in 
Ukraine has spurred a discussion as to whether this line can be main-
tained.70 Some experts believe that in the contemporary situation it is 
military non-alignment that best serves Finnish interests;71 others see 
the potential enlargement of NATO in Scandinavia as an important 
strengthening of the alliance.72 As we have shown above, the prevailing 
opinion among scholars and politicians alike is that Finland’s  acces-
sion to NATO would be too risky, as it would imply a severe cooling of 
relations with Moscow, at the very least. ‘The Russians made it quite 
clear that when they look across the border now, they see the Finns. 
If we were in NATO, they would see enemies. That’s their position,’ is 
how President Niinistö summed up the Russian view of Finland’s po-
tential membership of the alliance in an interview with a Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung journalist in September 2018.73
Conclusion
Having sought neutrality for several decades, after the end of the Cold 
War Finland embraced a policy of military non-alignment. This rein-
terpretation of the traditional understanding of neutrality has allowed 
the country to become openly involved in the West’s  political, eco-
nomic and military structures, without thereby provoking Russia too 
much.
We believe that Finland’s  consideration of Russian interests and 
of the Russian interpretation of the security situation on its western 
border is the main reason why Finland opts for this difficult balancing 
act, involving ever closer cooperation with NATO and the USA; main-
taining NATO non-member status; and emphasizing that the option 
of joining the alliance is always there. The experts and public opinion 
alike believe that joining NATO would be too risky. Few think that it 
would result in an outright military conflict, but given the historical 
contact and contention between Finland and Russia, even the risk of 
a sharp deterioration in relations with the neighboring power is just 
too great – even more so at a time when, by adopting modern forms 
of non-direct combat, Russia is working to destabilize democracy in 
Europe and beyond.
Russia’s  actions in Georgia, Ukraine and the Baltic region disturb 




the Finns have a unique understanding of the Russian perception of 
the world, and hence their response so far to their increasing feeling 
that their security is under threat has not been a  proclamation that 
they would seek NATO membership – an approach that might make 
sense to some in the current situation. Instead of openly embracing 
a  strong defense structure, they carefully build links with individual 
partner countries, or focus on groups such as NORDEFCO that are 
more palatable to Russia.
On the other hand, cooperation between Finland and NATO is clos-
er than ever. The Finns participate in training military personnel and 
exercises with member states; share information; and have access to 
decision-making processes thanks to ‘29+2’ format meetings. Finland 
is represented in the alliance’s peace-keeping missions and has a per-
manent mission to NATO in Brussels; the head of state participates 
in the annual summits of the alliance. Indeed, an uninitiated observer 
might be surprised to learn that Finland is not a full NATO member. 
Some experts even question whether Finland can still be considered 
a militarily non-aligned country.
Finland’s  political leaders, however, do not question that. Emerg-
ing out of Finnish attempts at neutrality in an environment that was 
strongly deformed by its proximity to an ideologically entirely incom-
patible superpower, military non-alignment has embedded itself firm-
ly into Finnish strategic thought. For decades, a policy of considering 
Russian interests when formulating their own security policy has paid 
off for Finland. So far there has not been a big enough shock in the 
international arena for them to want to change any of it.
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